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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Background and Purpose of the Study 
 
   Market opening, following the launch of the World Trade Organization 
regime, poses difficult challenges to most corporations, because they cannot 
flexibly respond to the swiftly changing competitive environments simply by 
utilizing their  own internal resources and capabilities. In this regard, most 
companies in the advanced countries, especially those engaged in high 
technology industries, have tried to strengthen their competitiveness by 
making collaborative relationships with other firms through strategic alliances. 
   The aim of this study is to examine the development of strategic alliances 
in the world telecommunications industry and to develop implications for 
Korea Telecom’s(KT) strategic alliances. 
 
   In this thesis, I would like to study the following major issues : 
-  Analyzing the realities of strategic alliances of global telecom 
 operators related to the radical changes in the environment. 
      -  Analyzing the current strategic alliances of Korea Telecom(KT) 
      -  Recommending the desirable strategies for KT's strategic alliances. 
 
 
1.2  Organization of the Study 
 
 4
   The introductory chapter examines the rat ionale of strategic alliances in 
the context of the changing telecom environment. Chapter 2 discusses the 
concept, motives, and types of strategic alliances. Chapter 3 examines the 
characteristics of strategic alliances, the impact of deregulation and structural 
change, and future direction of strategic alliances. Chapter 4 focuses on the 
current strategic alliances of KT and recommend desirable direction for KT. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the key findings of the research.  
 
[Figure 1.1]  Overview of the Study 
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Desirable Strategies  
ㅇ  Developing a Desirable Model  
ㅇ  Analyzing the Current SA of KT  
ㅇ  Recommendations 
 
Conclusions  
ㅇ  Summary of Key Findings 
 
 
Chapter 2  LITERATURE REVIEW ON STRATEGIC ALLIANCES  
 
 
2.1  Concept of Strategic Alliances 
 
   At its core, strategic alliance is a trading partnership that enhances the 
effectiveness of participating firms by providing mutually beneficial access of 
technologies, skills, or products. An alliance can take a variety of forms, 
ranging from an arm’s- length contract to a joint venture. Because various 
interpretations of the term exist, we define a strategic alliance as possessing 
simultaneously the following three necessary and sufficient characteristics:1 )   
   · The two or more firms that unite to pursue a set of agreed upon goals 
remain independent subsequent to the formation of the alliance. 
   · The partner firms share the benefits of the alliance and control over the 
performance of assigned tasks. 
   · The partner firms contribute on a continuing basis in one or more key 
strategic areas, e.g., technology, products, and so forth.  
 
   [Figure 2-1] Shows that strategic alliance is a complex interfirm 
relationship different from the traditional contractual agreements such as 
                                                 
1) M. Y. Yoshino and U.S. Rangan, “Strategic Alliances,” Harvard Business School Press, 1995, 5-6. 
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arm’s length buy/sell contracts, franchising, licensing, and cross- licensing, or 
the establishment of joint-venture companies. 
   As such, a strategic alliance is collaborative relationship of two or more 
companies created to accomplish mutually beneficial strategic goals and 
interests. Participating firms share the benefits of the alliance in proportion to 
their contribution. Strategic alliances is adopted widely by many corporations 
as a major vehicle for survival in the era of borderless competition. Especially 
in the IT industry, telecom operators(TOs) are trying to maintain their 
competitiveness and exploit new business opportunit ies by actively 
participating in M&A and strategic alliances. 
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[Figure 2.1] Range of Interfirm Links 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : M. Y. Yoshino and U. S. Rangan, “Strategic Alliances,”  Harvard Business School  
        Press, 1995, 8. 
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   We need to mention a specific feature of strategic alliances. In an alliance, 
two or more companies may collaborate to compete with a third party, but 
may compete with each other in other sectors. 
 
   As compared with other contractual agreements or M&A, strategic 
alliances may provide more intimate relationships for the participants than 
contractual agreements, and render more flexible relationship than M&A. 
Among the various types of intercorporate collaboration, strategic alliance is 
located between contractual agreements and M&A. It differs from contractual 
agreement because the alliance needs more interfirm collaboration; licensing 
and franchising is not an alliance since it means just a one- time transfer of 
technologies and know-how. M&A is a unidirectional transaction 
implemented by a firm. 
   One of the reasons corporations pursue strategic alliance is that it is 
relatively cheaper to obtain the required technologies and resources than 
contractual agreements or acquisition. In the case of an acquisition, the buyer 
has to pay a large sum of money and engage in a series of difficult activities 
including the replacement of the management, but alliance does not need such 
processes and allows to utilize  the existing technologies and resources while 
maintaining managerial independence. Also, strategic alliances do not require 
such huge amount of expenses required to monitor and control as mergers or 
licensing, and allows easy withdrawal from the business in case of 
unfavorable business results. 
 
 9
 
2.2  Motivation of Strategic Alliances 
 
   Strategic alliance is made to reduce or eliminate technological gaps 
between corporations through the development of new technologies, to 
improve qualities and enhance performance, and to continually 
expand/maintain market share in existing/new markets through the 
development/production of customized items. The recent increase of interfirm 
alliances can be explained by such factors as reduction of cost and time 
required in the development of new technologies and market entry, 
acquisition/sharing of information on new technologies and markets, sharing 
of complementary resources, dispersion of political and economical risks in 
unstable markets, and so forth.  
 
   According to Vyas, Shelburn & Rogers (1995)2) , strategic alliance occurs 
between two or more corporations located inside an industry, or different 
industries to expand distribution networks, induce synergy, reduce costs and 
expenses, disperse risks and secure raw materials through the introduction of 
new technologies. 
 
   Strategic alliance allows easy access to new technologies and resources, 
in such fields as technologies, manufacturing, banking and marketing, and 
also has an effect of preventing unnecessary competit ion beforehand. On the 
other hands, it appears that the motives of implementing strategic alliances 
are different by the industrial development stages, and the competitiveness of 
participants. Strategic alliances most actively occur in growth industries. On 
the other hand, strategic alliance has not been popular in mature industries 
because of their oligopolistic industrial structure which prevents easy access 
to existing markets. However, recent trend is that strategic alliance is 
becoming popular even in mature industries such as the  telecommunications 
industry for the development of improved new products. 
                                                 
2) Niren M. Vyas, William L. Shelburn and Dennis C. Rogers, “An Analysis of Strategic Alliances : 
  Forms, Function and Framework,” Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, Vol.10, No.3 , 1995. 
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   Another theory on the strategic motives of strategic alliances was 
proposed by Lorange and Roos (1992). They divided the motives for strategic 
alliances into the following four categories : (1) defensive type, (2) 
maintenance type, (3) pursuing type and (4) restructuring type. 
 
[Table 2-1] Motives and Objectives of Strategic Alliances by Industrial 
         Development Stages 
 Motives  Objectives  
Mature  
industry  
- Enter into foreign markets  
- Accelerate technological innovation 
- Improve productivity  
- Stem the market entry of new competitors  
- Disperse risks  
- Share excessive cost of market entry  
- Maintain existing technologies  
- Hold competitive p osition 
- Acquire technologies required for 
 creating value added 
- Secure learning time  
Growing 
industry  
- Build footholds for competition 
- Acquire major managerial resources  
- Build core infrastructure  
- Legally introduce new products  
- Access to marke ts  
- Overcome functional restrictions 
- Improve management capability  
- Educate new consumers  
- Overcome unstable management 
 environment 
- Secure monopolistic position 
 
Source : Jung -Ho Pyo, “A Study on Strategic Alliances among IT Operators,” 1996, 14. 
 
   As shown in [Table 2-2], the defensive type motive appears when a 
market leading firm tries to acquire new technologies through an alliance with 
small-sized firms specialized in specific fields, develop specific technologies, 
secure stable supply of raw materials, or exploit new business opportunities. 
The maintenance type appears when a firm is trying to maximize its 
competitive efficiency through strategic alliance as shown in some alliances 
in wireless cellular companies. 
   The pursuing type appears when a firm is trying to make an alliance to 
enhance its position in the market. The restructuring type occurs when a firm 
is trying to create value and build capabilities to facilitate business 
restructuring.  
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[Table 2-2] Strategic Motives of Strategic Alliances 
Position in Market 
 
Leading Firm Pursuing Firm 
Main Business  Defensive Pursuing Importance 
of Business Secondary 
Business 
Maintenance Restructuring 
 
Source : Peter Lorange and Johan Roos, “  Strategic Alliance : Formulation, 
       Implementation and Evolution,” Backwell, 1992. 
 
   For firms located in the same industry, strategic alliance is carried out to 
expand markets or to customize products, while firms located in different 
industries use alliance to acquire new technologies or improve existing 
technologies. Recently, strategic alliances aimed at the enhancement of long-
term competitiveness rather than short- term cost reduction are increasing in 
number. 
   Likewise interfirm strategic alliances are being widely adopted, especially 
in the IT industry, to improve productivity through the redesign of specialized 
job processes to break through the status quo in the main business through 
technological innovation, to develop secondary main businesses, and to build 
a global network through the securing of competitive strength in specific 
fields. However, there are also risks of emerging monopolistic or oligopolistic 
architecture in an industry through interfirm strategic alliances. 
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2.3  Types of Strategic Alliances 
 
   Strategic alliances can be classified in various ways on the basis of the 
period of collaboration, motives, contents and extent of alliances. Based on 
the period of collaboration, strategic alliances can be divided into two 
categories: one- time short- term collaboration and consecutive long- term 
collaboration. In general, the average collaboration period of an alliance in 
the 1990s is reduced to 4~5 years. In the cases of long- term alliances, 
companies participating in strategic alliances tend to prefer a series of short-
term projects renewed or extended consecutively. However, if we count the 
number of interfirm collaborations rather than that of unit projects, firms 
which have experiences with interfirm collaborations more than once tends to 
prefer strategic alliances again.  
   Hergert & Morris (1988)3 )  classified strategic alliances based on the 
extent of collaboration into the following types : restrictive collaboration in a 
couple of sectors and general collaboration. They found that firms tend to 
build cooperative relationship within a restrictive scope of business, but 
following the accumulation of experiences in interfirm cooperation, those 
firms tend to prefer all-out collaborations in general sectors. According to 
Hergert & Morris (1988), business collaborations most frequent ly occurred in 
such sectors as joint technological development, marketing and processing on 
commission, while the frequency of collaborations in general sectors such as 
development and manufacturing, or development and marketing was 
releatively low. This means that companies engaged in global business tends 
to selectively cooperate with each other to minimize troubles or burdens 
contingent to mutual collaboration.  
   On the other hand, Porter(1986)4)  categorized strategic alliances into X, Y, 
Z types of coalitions. Type X is coalitions across activities in which entities 
specialized in one or two sectors in a network supplement each other 
                                                 
3)  Hergert, M. and Morris, D., “Trends in International Collaborative Agreements . In Cooperative 
  Strategies in International Business,” Lexington Books, 1988. 
4)  Michael E. Porter, “Competition in Global Industries,” Harvard Business School Press , 1986, 
  336-338. 
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to develop, manufacture and supply a major product. Type Y is coalitions 
within activities in which companies cooperate with each other in a single 
sector, such as joint development of a technology. Type Z is a hybrid of type 
X and type Y. 
   Yoshino and Rangan (1995) suggested a typology of alliances based on  
conflict potential and extent of organizational interaction as shown in [Figure 
2-2]. 
 
[Figure 2.2] Typology of Alliances 
 
Precompetitive  
Alliances 
Competitive 
Alliances 
Procompetitive  
Alliances 
Noncompetitive 
Alliances 
 
 
 
Source : M. Y. Yoshino and U. S. Rangan, “Strategic Alliances,”  Harvard Business School 
        Press , 1995, 19. 
 
 
   Procompetitive alliances are generally interindustry, vertical value-chain 
relationships, such as between manufacturers and their suppliers or 
distributors. Once managed at arm’s- length, they are now accorded much 
more attentio n as the strategic nature of these links is widely recognized.  
General Motors’ link with Hitachi is representative of procompetitive 
alliances. In such links, although firms work closely to develop or improve 
products and processes, this type of cooperation requires low levels of 
organizational interaction. Moreover, the firms tend not to be rivals. Indeed, 
some firms, such as Toyota, rely on a federation of procompetitive alliances 
to compete against their market rivals, adding further dimensions to the arena 
of competition. The potential for conflict in such alliances is low.  
 
High 
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Low                          High 
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   Noncompetitive alliances tend to be intraindustry links among 
noncompeting firms. For example, General Motors and Isuzu, jointly develop 
a small car that both will sell. The leve l of interaction in this cooperative 
effort is high. 
   Competitive alliances are similar to noncompetitive alliances in terms of 
the joint activity (and hence in the level of organizational interaction) but 
differ in that the partners are apt to be direct competitors in the final product 
market. Examples include the ties between General Motors and Toyota, which 
are jointly manufacturing cars in Fremont, California. 
   Precompetitive alliances typically bring together firms from different, 
often unrelated industries to work on well-defined activities such as new 
technology development . DuPont and Sony’s cooperative development of 
optical memory-storage products is an example. 
   [Table 2-3] shown the relative importance of strategic objectives by 
alliance type. 
 
[Table 2-3] Relative Importance of Strategic Objectives in Alliances 
  Strategic Objectives  
Alliance Type  Flexibility 
Core 
Protection Learning 
Value 
Adding 
Precompetitive  
Competitive 
Noncompetitive 
Procompetitive  
**** 
* 
** 
*** 
*** 
**** 
* 
** 
** 
*** 
**** 
* 
* 
** 
*** 
**** 
* Number of asterisks indicates relative importance in each alliance type. 
 
Source : M.Y.Yoshino and U.S. Rangan, “Strategic Alliances,” Harvard Business School Press, 
       1995, 22. 
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Chapter 3  STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN THE WORLD TELECOM 
             INDUSTRY 
 
 
3.1  Characteristics of Strategic Alliances in the Telecom Industry 
 
3.1.1  Strategic Alliances in the Telecom Industry 
 
   Following the conclusion of the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications Services, the meaning of national borders has become 
insignificant and competition in the world telecom markets has intensified. In 
this context, telecom operators (TOs) of most nations have tried to create 
strategic alliances to secure existing markets or to enter into new markets. 
Traditionally, telecom markets have been managed by governments. However, 
recent trends of globalization of corporate management, advancement of 
telecom technologies and diversification of telecom demands have brought 
about a rapid increase of strategic alliances between TOs. Such trends have 
facilitated the transfer of market control functions of governments to large 
TOs. It is expected that the WTO agreement would accelerate the formation 
of strategic alliances between TOs, which would eventually create global 
telecom service groups with enormous market clout and operating seamless 
global telecom networks. 
 
3.1.2  Motivation of Strategic Alliances 
 
   In general, strategic alliance has been made to expand existing markets, 
cope with competitors, overcome barriers to market entry, acquire 
complementary technologies, share resources and risks, and secure the 
flexibility of organizational structure. Among these, the following five 
motives might be most relevant to strategic alliances made by TOs.5)  
 
                                                 
5) Jung-Il Choi, “Present Status and Prospects of International Strategic Alliances between Telecom 
  Operators,” Information and Communications Policy Vol.184, 1997, 23-24. 
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   The first thing to consider is the securing of market share, and holding off 
of competitors. The alliance cases under this category are the formation of
「Unisource」by Telia in Sweden, PTT in Switzerland, KPN in Netherlands, 
and Telefonica in Spain to stem the expansion of British Telecom (BT) to the 
European market, and the establishment of a joint venture company between 
BT and AT&T to secure a global telecom network, the creation of「Global 
One」by Deutsche Telecom (DT), France Telecom (FT) and Sprint, and the 
formation of「WorldPartners」 led by AT&T.  
   The second motive is for entering into new business areas or expanding 
existing service markets by acquiring new service elements or securing more 
efficient distribution channels from partner companies. An alliance between 
AT&T and McCaw Cellular or the alliance between AT&T and GTE for 
wireless data services, the alliance between AT&T and NTT for international 
telecommunications business, the joint venture between Sprint, Comcast, and 
Cox Cable, the PCS consortium formed between Bell Atlantic, Nynex, US 
West, and AirTouch would belong to this category.  
   The third motive is to take advantage of strategic alliances with TOs in 
other countries as opportunities for entering into telecommunications markets 
of those nations. Strictly speaking, global telecom service groups have been 
established based on this motive. For example, BT took the advantage of the 
establishment of a JV company with AT&T in entering the US telecom market, 
and AT&T grasped that opportunity to participate in the European telecom 
market. 
   The fourth motive is the pursuit of economic rationalization. The IT 
industry has inherent characteristics such as economy of scale, economy of 
scope and network externality. It means that the integrated management and 
provision of telecom network facilities including cable TV and broadcasting 
networks by a company would be much more efficient and economical than 
that where numerous service providers try to manage and provide telecom and 
broadcasting services through separate network facilities. In this case, an 
integrated TO would make another alliance with equipment vendors to use it 
as leverage in negotiating with other suppliers.  
 17
   The fifth motive is the sharing of resources and risks. The construction of 
global telecom networks or participation in global telecom markets would 
require huge investment with considerable risks. Strategic alliance might 
distribute such risks and reduce burdens of participating firms through 
sharing of appropriate resources. 
 
 
3.1.3 Factors Facilitating Strategic Alliances 
 
   The factors facilitating strategic alliances in the IT industry could be 
divided into two categories: external and internal.6 )  Among the external 
factors, the first to be considered would be governmental policies on 
deregulation and market competition. An example of this was the strategic 
alliance fever in the US market which was ignited by the 1984 divestiture of 
AT&T. The AT&T divestiture has stimulated competitions in long-distance 
telephone services and equipment markets. Thanks to the competition, 
consumers could enjoy price reduction, a new breed of innovative products 
and much improved services. 
   The second factor is the inducement of market competition. The introduction of 
competition in basic telecom service markets started in the US, UK and Japan in the 
1980s and expanded to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada in the 1990s. The 
European Union (EU) opened its telecom market in 1998. Most governments have 
tried to increase competition in the basic telecom service markets as well as 
to induce intra-market competition between regional telephone companies, 
cable TV companies, and long-distance telephone operators, while protecting 
consumers. 
   Rapid advancement of telecom technologies and inter-dependencies 
between new services and telecom network technologies facilitated the 
vertical or horizontal collaboration between TOs. Also traditional types of 
collaboration between TOs, such as joint venture or M&A are increasing 
continuously.  
                                                 
6) Jung-Ho Pyo, “A Study on Strategic Alliances among Information and Telecommunications 
  Operators,” Soon Chun Hyang University, 1996, 40-44. 
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   The third factor is the opening of telecom markets and globalization. In 
the IT industry which has large potential of globalization, the market opening 
under the WTO regime would inevitably bring about the globalization, and 
the globalization would directly induce the intensification of competition.  
   The fourth factor is the emergence of global satellite networks and 
information superhighway. Such global networks would induce the 
collaborations among TOs, and accordingly the number of strategic alliances 
would also increase. 
   The fifth factor is the integration of IT technologies. Rapid advancement 
of IT technologies resulted in the integration of once- independent 
technologies, and such trend reduces the life cycle of most products and 
services and increases the R&D costs and risks. The integration of 
technologies also renders the boundaries of existing industries ambiguous and 
makes intra- industry competition more fluid. The result is the facilitation of 
strategic alliances. 
   Internal factors facilitating strategic alliances are such variables which 
encourage strategic alliances within a TO. These include many factors such as 
the necessity of rapid introduction of new products, efficient market entry, 
need of forward/backward links (economy of scope), upgrading of R&D 
capabilities, increase of development and manufacturing cost, economy of 
scale, and so forth.  
 
 
3.1.4  Types of Strategic Alliances in the IT Industry 
 
   Strategic alliances between TOs can be classified by geographic 
dimension (cross-border and domestic) and characteristics of alliances 
(network, technology and investment). The geographic dimension shows the 
type of markets, while the alliance characteristics dimension shows its 
position in terms of marketing competence, technological capacities and 
financing capabilities. By classifying strategic alliances into this framework, 
we can see a trend of shifting interests of TOs’ to global telecom services, 
overseas investments and development of new revenue source.  
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[Table 3-1] Strategic Alliances between TOs 
 
 Cross-Border Domestic  
Network 
ㅇ  Global Network Alliance 
   - AT&T WorldPartners  
   - BT/MCI Concert  
   - FT/DT/Sprint 
    Global One  
   - Unisource  
   - Cable & Wireless 
 
 
ㅇ  Vertical Alliance (Market entry) 
   - AT&T/McCaw Cellula  
   - Sprint/TCI/Cox Cable/Comcast 
ㅇ  Alliances to share the cost and risks  
   - Bell Atlantic/NYNEX/USWest/ 
    Airtouch 
ㅇ  Horizontal alliances  
   - Alliances between RBOCs, Cable TV 
    operators  
Technology 
ㅇ  TOs and IT equipment Manufacturers  
   - BT/Stratacom 
ㅇ  Collaboration to develop new products  
   - AT&T/Unitel 
ㅇ  International collaboration of GMPCS  
   - Iridium, Globalstar, ICO, Odyssey 
ㅇ  TOs and Multimedia firms  
   - FT/General Magic, AT&T/Lotus Corp  
Investment  
ㅇ  Equity participation in privatiation of incumbant TOs  
ㅇ  Entering into IT markets in advanced countries  
ㅇ  Participation in the construction of telecom infrastructure or new telecom 
   projects  
 
Source : Korea Telecom, “Telecommunications Policies and Market Trends in Major 
       Countries pursuant to Environmental Changes,”  1998, 22. 
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3.2  The Impact of Deregulation and Structural Change 
 
3.2.1  The Korean Concession in the WTO Agreement on Basic 
      Telecommunications Services 
 
   As shown in [Table 3-2], the main issues in the final concession of the 
Korean government submitted to the WTO are the removal of entry barriers  
to the Korean telecom market and the mitigation of regulation on marketing. 
The government allowed foreign TOs access to the domestic telecom services 
markets and abolished regulations on service provision (restriction on facility 
installation and network access). 
   The government also agreed to provide de facto market access through 
autonomy in telecom rate setting, cost-based access charge, fair and non-
discriminatory interconnection agreement between TOs and guarantee of 
transparency.  
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[Table 3-2] Major Issues in the Korean Concession to the WTO Agreement 
         on Basic Telecom Services. 
 
I tem Current Final Concessions 
Foreign ownership limit  
 
 
 
 
 
Wired : prohibited, 
Wireless 33%  
Single person ownership: 
Wired : 10% 
Wireless : 33%  
  KT: 1% 
- Allow 33% in wired/wireless from 
  1998(KT: 20%) 
- Allow 49% in wired/wireless from 
     (KT: 33%) 
- Single person ownership limit : ditto  
  (KT: 3%) 
Foreign major shareholders  Prohibited  - To be allowed in 1999(except KT) 
Appointment of foreigners  
as representatives or 
officers of local firms  
Representative : Prohibited  
Officer: less than a third of 
       total officers  
- Allow the appointment of foreigners  
  as representatives in 1998  
- Abolish the restriction on No office rs  
Access to PSTN  
Voic  
 
 
Prohibited  
 
 
 
-  Allow from 1999 (foreigners’ 
  ownership limited to 49%) 
- Allow 100% foreigners’ ownership  
  from 2001 
Resale  
 
Other resale  No limits  - 100 % allowed from 1998 
No. of service providers  
 
Prior notification by the  
Government Application at  
any time (1996) 
- Possible through the restriction of 
  radio spectrum allocation 
 
Cross-border supply  
 
Restriction is possible  
 
- Allow under the commercial 
  contractual agreements with domestic  
operators  
Regulation rules  Apply domestic regulations - Adopt regulation principles in the    Reference Paper 
One -way satellite  
broadcasting service: 
Satellite TC broadcasting  
such as DTH/DBS, digital 
satellite radio broadcast 
Possible to restrict  
 
 
-  Excluding from the concession  
 
 
 
Source: Sung-Baik Oh, “Long-Term Strategy of KT for the Transformation into Global 
      Telecom Service Group,” KISDI, 1997, 52. 
 22
3.2.2  Changes in the Regulatory Environment of Major Countries 
 
   Upon the conclusion of the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications Services, it is expected that the signatories will 
implement deregulation in the IT industry. [Table 3-3] compares the 
concessions submitted by major signatories. 
 
[Table 3-3] Comparison of Concessions of Major Signatories 
WTO 
Concession Fore ign Ownership Limit  
Foreign  
Major  
Shareholder 
Restriction on 
Representative  
Restriction  
on Voice  
Resale  
USA  
Wired: 100%  
Wireless:Indirect 100%, 
       Direct 20%  
No limit  No limit  No limit  
Canada 
Facility ownership: 
       46.7%  
    (Direct: 20%) 
No limit  
Monopoly on international 
telephone service by Sept. 
1998 
No limit  
UK 100%  No limit  No limit  No limit  
Germany 100%  No limit  No limit  No limit  
France  
Wired : 100%  
Wireless: Indirect 100%, 
        Direct  20%  
No limit  No limit  No limit  
Japan  100%  No limit  NTT / KDD: 20%  No limit  
Singapore  Direct: 49%  Indirect: 24.9%  No limit  
Facility -based wired service: 
Monopoly of ST until Mar.  
2000 
No limit  
Korea  Wired/wireless: 49%  No limit  (Except KT) KT: 33% No limit  
 
Source: Sung-Baik Oh, “Long-Term Strategy of KT for the Transformation into Global 
      Telecom Service Group,” KISDI, 1997, 54-57. 
 
   By the 1970s, most countries regarded the telecom industry as public 
utilities based on the concept of natural monopoly.  
   However, rapid technological innovations in the fields of fiber optics, 
satellites and wireless in the 1980s and innovation in the interworking of 
communications, broadcasting, and computer industries made the concept of 
natural monopoly obsolete. To meet the diversifying demands of mult inational 
companies and maximize the efficiencies of service provision through 
economy of scale, incumbent TOs have tried to forge strategic alliances with 
each other, and merge or acquire other companies in the industry.  
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   In the section, I will briefly examine the history of telecom markets and 
patterns of strategic alliances in the US, UK and Japan, which have led the 
deregulation in the telecom markets.7 )  
 
1) USA 
 
   After the 1984 AT&T divestiture, the US long-distance telecom market 
has been occupied by three large TOs. As deregulation on the long-distance 
market has been successfully implemented, most TOs have concentrated their 
efforts on business diversification and strategic alliance. It seems that the 
conceptual guideline of the US government on deregulation has been  
‘deregulation means competition.’   
   This attitude is based on the belief that deregulation would facilitate 
market competition, which will lower the level of telecom rates and improve 
the quality of services. A good example was the revision of Telecom Act in 
February 1996.  
   The revised Telecom Act may be regarded as a national strategy of the US 
to build up competitive strength to meet the threat of global mega-TOs. This 
Act actually removed the business restrictions of AT&T, RBOCs, and cable 
TV companies. 
 
   [Table 3-4] summarizes the major changes in the US regulatory 
environment and the resulting pattern of alliances forged by AT&T 
                                                 
7) Jung-Ho Pyo, “Dynamic Patterns of Strategic Alliances of Global Telecoms after the WTO Basic 
  Telecommunications Agreements,” 1997, 16-19. 
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[Table 3-4] Changes in the US Regulatory Environment and Pattern of 
         AT&T’s Alliances 
 Changes in Regulatory Environment  Pattern of AT&T’s Alliances  
 
’82 
 
’84 
 
’85 
 
 
 
‘86 
 
 
 
’89 
 
 
‘91 
 
 
 
 
 
’92 
 
 
 
 
 
’94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
’95 
 
’96 
 
 
 
-  The Modification of Final Judgement  
 
- Divestiture of AT&T 
 
- Approve differential tariff system (FCC) 
 
- Introduce interconnection rate system 
 
- Computer III Decision of FCC, separation of 
 enhanced service sector from AT&T and  
 RBOCs, abolish restriction on subsidiaries  
  
-  Introduce price caps to AT&T 
 
 
- Introduce price caps to RBOCs (FCC)  
- Allow the provision o f information services  
  by RBOCs  
- Abolish price caps for business services of 
  AT&T 
 
- Allow video transmission services to LECs  
  (FCC) 
- Announce National Information Infrastructure  
  (NII) 
- Designate the second cellular operators  
 
- VP Gore, propose Global Information 
Infrastructure at the ITU meeting held in  
Bueno Aires  
- Approve commercial video/dial tone services  
- Approve alliances of BT/MCI, AT&T/McCaw  
  Cellular 
 
 
-  Approve the Revised Telecom Act 
 
- February 1996, enact the revised Telecom Act 
 
 
ㅇ  No alliances before 1982 
 
ㅇ  1982~1988 Promote alliances thanks to 
   deregulation in spite of Anti-Trust laws  
 
 -  Restrict diversification of AT&T 
- Establish joint ventures or subsidiaries on 
 equipment manufacturing  (make alliance with 
 Philips to develop and produce switching systems  
 in 1984) 
- Diversify into VAN and computer business  
Equity participation or joint venture(23.5% equity  
participation in Olivetti for the marketing of 
computers) 
 
ㅇ  1989 -1995 Implement strategic alliances and 
   M&A following the deregulation  
 
-  Promote joint venure, M&A in computers, 
 telecom equipment manufacturing and VAN 
(Acquire Istel Group in the UK in 1989, Acquire  
 messaging business of NCR and Western Union 
 in 1991) 
- Equity participation and alliances in te lecom 
 service sectors(Establish WorldPartners in 1993) 
 - Entering into new service sectors  
(20% equity participation in Unitel in Canada in  
 1992, Merging with McCaw Cellular in 1994) 
 
ㅇ  Announce separation of organizations to 
   concentrate in telecom service sector in 1995 
 
ㅇ  Participate in diverse fields following the  
   complete liberalization of telecom markets after 
   1996(1998 : Acquire Teleport to participate in  
   local telephone service, Merging with TCI, the 
   largest cable TV company in the US, alliance 
   with BT for international telecom services,  
   1997: Announce negotiation with SBC for M&A) 
 
ㅇ  December 1998: Acquire global telecom network  
   of IBM  
 
ㅇ  April 1999: Capital alliance with Japan Telecom 
 
ㅇ  April 1999: Alliance with NTT  
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2) UK 
 
   The British government started the liberalization of telecom industry and 
introduced competition through the privatization of British Telecom in 1984 
(51% equity shares were sold at that time and the remaining disposed by 
1993).  
   By the early 1990s, the UK telecom market has maintained a duopolistic 
structure by BT and Mercury. In March 1991, the Department of Trade and 
Industry published a white paper ‘Competition and Selection,’ which 
abolished the duopoly policy in the telecom market. Accordingly, other 
players were allowed to participate in the telephone service market, and 
especially cable TV companies were allowed to get licenses on telephone 
services. With this policy, the UK adopted the technology- led competition for 
the first time in the telecom industry.  
   Telecom policies of the UK tends to put emphasis on international 
telephony rather than local telephony, and place more weight on the US 
markets than the European market. In this context, the UK government has 
focused on strengthening BT’s competitiveness, which has been in an inferior 
position compared with AT&T, NTT, and DT.  
   [Table 3-5] summarizes the changes in regulatory environment in the UK 
and the resulting pattern of strategic alliances of BT.  
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[Table 3-5] Changes in the UK Regulatory Environment and the Pattern of 
         BT’s Alliances 
 Changes in Regulatory Environment  Pattern of BT ’s Alliances  
 
’84 
 
’85 
 
 
’87 
 
 
‘88 
 
 
 
 
’91 
 
 
 
’93 
 
 
’94 
 
 
’95 
 
 
‘96 
 
 
 
‘98 
 
 
 
 
   
-  Privatization of BT, Licensing to Mercury  
 
-  Start competition between two cellular 
 operators (Cellnet, Vodafone)  
- Start Competition in long-distance market  
between BT and Mercury  
 
- Allow simple resale of domestic private  
  lines and two -way  breakout 
- EU prepared guidelines on the opening of 
  European market  
- DTI announced white paper ‘Competition  
  and Selection’  
  -  Complete opening of the UK telecom market  
- The UK government sold out of BT ’s equity  
  shares  
- Provided licenses of public service provision  
  to Sprint and AT&T 
- OFTEL announced policies on effective 
competition structure  
 
- Abolished duopoly in facility-based 
  international telephony 
- OFTEL introduced standard interconnection 
  rates  
- Liberalization of voice telephony and 
  telecom infrastructure business in the EU  
 
   ㅇ After the 1984 privatization, diversified  
     international businesses through M&A, equity 
     participation, JV establishment (acquire 10%  
     equity of ITT Dialcom in 1986, acquire 25%  
     equity of Belize Telecom in 1988) 
 ㅇ After 1988, concentrated in the US markets  
  -  Acquire 80% equity of Metrocast, a paging 
   company, in 1988 
  -  Acquire Tymnet in 1989 (merged with BT in  
   1991), acquire 22% equity of McCaw Cellular 
   (disposed to AT&T in 1992) 
  -  Acquire 43% equity shares of MCI (US$ 4.3 
   billion) in 1993  
   ㅇ After 1991, concentrated in strategic alliance 
     for the provision of global services  
  -  1991 : establish Suncordia  
    - 1994 : establish Concert (BT 75%, MCI 25%) 
  -  1996/1997 : make alliances with many Tos 
   for nternational data services (ITJ, DACOM, 
   Telefonica) 
  -  1998 : announce JV establishment with AT&T  
   (expect synergy effects of combining  
   technologies/infrastructure of AT&T and  
   marketing forces of BT) 
  -  M arch 1998 : establish BT Communications 
   Service (70%) along with Marubenico 
  -  July 1998 : 33.3% equity participation in  
   Banariang in Malaysia  
  -  Sept. 1998 : acquire 23.49% equity stakes of 
   LG Telecom 
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3) Japan 
 
   In 1985, Japan introduced competition in the telecom market through the 
privatization of NTT. Accordingly, in 1987 three new common carriers (DDI, 
Japan Telecom, and Teleway Japan) participated in the long-distance market 
monopolized by NTT until then. In 1989, two new common carriers (IDC and 
ITJ) joined the international telephone service market. 
   The Japanese government decided to strengthen the international 
competitiveness of NTT to cope with the trend of globalization in the world 
IT markets. In June 1997, the Japanese government revised a series of 
communications-related laws including Telecommunications Business Act, 
NTT Act, and KDD Act. 
   These measures encouraged TOs to explore new businesses and facilitate  
strategic alliances and M&As between TOs. 
   [Table 3-6] summarizes the changes in the Japanese regulatory 
environment and the resulting pattern of NTT’s alliances. 
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[Table 3-6] Changes in the Japanese Regulatory Environment and Pattern of 
         NTT’s Alliances 
 Changes in Regulatory Environment  Pattern of NTT’s  Aliances  
 
’85 
 
’87 
 
 
’89 
 
 
 
’91 
~  
’92 
 
 
 
’94 
 
 
 
’95 
 
 
 
’96 
 
 
 
 
 
’97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  Privatization of NTT  
 
- Introduce competition in the long-distance 
market (NTT and 3 NCCs) 
 
 Start competition in the international telecom 
market (KDD and 2 NCCs) 
- Freeze the s eparation of NTT for 5 years  
 
- Introduce business group system (long-distance, 
regional)  
- Introduce selective tariff system by NTT and 
NCCs  
- Establish a wireless mobile subsidiary  
 
- Announce Asia Information Infrastructure 
around Japan  
- NTT, apply same interconnection rate to NCCs  
 
- Start PHS service  
- Additionally designate 27 new operators in 7 
sectors  
 
- Interim announcement on deregulation of 
telecom industry  
- Liberalize tariff -setting of mobile cellular 
services  
- Decision on the separation of NTT  
 
- Revision of 3 telecom-related acts (dissolution 
of business divisions) 
- Announce full liberalization of tariff of long-
distance and international telephony from 
1998(introduce price cap system) 
   ㅇ 1985 -1990 : privatization and introduction of 
     competition  
  -  Diversify businesses through establishment of 
   subsidiaries  
  -  Forge alliances around international consulting 
   and engineering 
 ㅇ  After 1991 : set corporate goal as global 
     corporation/ leader in multimedia businesses  
  -  Adopt diverse contractual agreements in  
   multimedia sectors (joint development, joint 
   marketing) 
  -  In 1994, make alliance with General Magic, 
   Silicon Graphics, MS for the joint development  
   of multimedia software  
  -  In 1995, make alliance with PictureTel to  
   develop N-ISDN -based video conferencing 
   system 
 ㅇ Engage in telephone network construction project  
     based on BOT(Built, Own and Transfer) scheme, 
     technological cooperation  
  -  In 1995, particpate in Filipino telephone project  
   along with Smart Communication  
 ㅇ  In 1997, make alliances to exploit newly open 
     markets and overseas markets. 
   ㅇ In April 1999, alliance with AT&T 
     (establishment of international data network, 
      operation and management)  
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3.2.3  Structural Changes in the Global Telecom Market  
 
   Analysys, a consulting firm, proposed a four-stage restructuring model as 
shown in [Figure 3-1]. 
 
[Figure 3-1] Four Stages in the Restructuring of the Global Telecoms Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Analysys, “Strategic Alliance,”  1994, P.xi. 
 
 
   First, Stage 1 was the period of independent national TOs before 1993. In 
this stage, each country employed independent telecom policies based on the 
idea of telecom sovereignty and maintained state- run telecom monopoly under 
the concept of state-ownership of telecommunications. However, as 
globalization in other industries such as manufacturing had been in progress 
to no small extent, participants in such industries could not have been 
satisfied with the quality of international telecom services provided by such 
monopolies. Such dissatisfaction had acted as an opportunity for TOs to move 
into other telecom markets. Towards the end of this period, there had been 
growing demands for the globalization as the capacities of international 
 
1. Independent national TOs  
(up to 1993) 
2. Alliance groups emerge 
(1993-1996) 
3. Alliance blocs consolidate and 
Service providers 
(nationally and 
vertically  
specialised) 
4. Separation of infrastructure and 
Infrastructures  
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private networks had been continually growing, more and more corporate 
customers had begun to leave existing telecom markets, and increasing 
pressure for the opening of telecom markets. Thus, most TOs began to take 
into serious consideration strategic alliances with other TOs. 
   In Stage 2 which was from 1993 to 1996, alliance groups began to emerge. 
Although existing state- run TOs still remained strong, the conclusion of the 
WTO Basic Telecom Agreement accelerated the forging of global strategic 
alliances among TOs. Thanks to the opening of telecom markets, international 
competition began to spread into domestic markets, and the struggles to take 
away the market initiatives were getting fiercer. Each alliance tried to 
increase the number of partners to take advantage of economy of scale. 
   Stage 3 is from 1997 to 2001, During this period alliance blocs begin to 
consolidate and enter each others’ domain. Continuous competition, 
cooperation, market ingression and merger and acquisition among TOs and 
others will readjust the global telecom markets and eventually a few alliance 
blocs will survive the competition and occupy oligopolistic positions. The 
integration of business activities such as marketing activities, quality control, 
etc., among partners of an alliance bloc will increase the influence of each 
alliance bloc to its partner TOs. Alliance blocs’ efforts to trade foreign stakes 
will also be intensified during this period. 
   In Stage 4 which will start from 2002, TOs will separate infrastructure 
operations from their service provision businesses. In this period, domestic 
telecom network of each country will be integrated into a global telecom 
network which will be established on the basis of a single global standard. 
Service providers will position themselves as value-added service operations 
based on multimedia technologies such as video-on-demand, financial service 
network, etc., serving specific customer groups.  
   As shown in [Figure 3-1], the telecom industry has been on the move 
more or less according to this model. Whether the future reorganization of the 
telecom industry will follow this scenario is a matter of primary concern to us.  
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3.3  Future Direction of Strategic Alliances in the Telecom Industry 
 
   Recent trend of integrating industries and technologies sets off business 
alliances among TOs to provide integrated IT services which can meet the 
diverse demands of customers on communications, information gathering and 
entertainment. [Figure 3-2] shows a value chain in the IT industry. Customers 
want service providers who can offer various integrated services, and TOs try 
to branch out into new business sectors with high potentials. Such supply and 
demand acts as a motive for TOs to promote strategic alliances for the 
provision of integrated IT services. 
 
[Figure 3-2] Value Chain in the IT Industry 
 
 
Source : Korea Telecom, Management and Technology, Vol. 102, 1998, 52. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Korea Telecom, “Management and Technology,”  January/February , 1998, 52.
 Definition 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cases 
 
 
 
 
 
 Purpose 
of alliance  
· Integrated 
 service packages, 
 integrated billing/ 
 marketing 
 
 
· Telephone 
· Cable TV 
· On-line service 
 
 
 
 
· Secure all the 
 elements necessary 
 for the provision of 
 integrated package 
 services 
· Acquire elements to
 meet the demands of
 service providers 
· Integration of 
 contents, 
 conversion to 
 common format  
 
 
· Voice mail 
· Movie channels 
· Database 
 
 
 
 
· Understand 
 demands of 
 service providers 
· Secure access to 
 core service 
 providers 
· Compatibility 
 with systems of 
 service providers 
· Joint development 
 or access to core 
 applications 
· Switching/transmi
 ssion through  
 diverse telecom 
 network 
 
 
· N-ISDN 
· W-ISDN 
· Radio network 
· Satellite network 
 (DBS, LEO, etc.) 
 
 
· Secure diverse 
 network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
· Provide user 
 interface following 
 customer demands 
 
 
 
· PCS 
· Phone 
· Fax 
· Cellulars 
· PDAs 
 
 
· Secure influence in  
 the standard-setting 
 processes of terminals
· Secure compatibility 
 between terminals 
· Availability of core 
 applications 
· User-friendly 
 functions 
· Creation of 
 contents specialized 
 for media 
 
 
 
· Movie 
· News 
· Music 
 
 
 
 
· Securing of 
 contents for service 
 differentiation  
· Improve its position 
 in negotiation with  
 other providers 
 using its own 
 contents  
     
 
Provision of 
regional services/ 
packages 
 
End-user 
equipment and 
applications 
 
Creation and 
provisio  of 
services 
 
Content 
creation 
Switching / 
transmission 
 32
 
   Thus, traditional TOs are actively pushing forward strategic alliances to 
integrated value chains in the IT industry. In other words, they concentrate on 
securing influences in contents creation businesses with high value-adding 
potential, and try to differentiate their services through the development of 
diverse packages of service and contents. They also speed up the network 
enhancement and the deployment of wideband network and actively engage in 
the development of user terminals and applications required for the provision 
of enhanced services such as multimedia services. 
   Generally, TOs are inclined to become an integrated IT service provider 
on the value chain of the IT industry. They try to establish an integrated 
system through which they can offer various entertainment services such as 
movies or music and information services which has been provided through 
computer on- line services, as well as traditional telecom services such as toll, 
cellular wireless and local telephone services. 
   [Figure 3-3] shows the case of strategic alliances between US West and 
AT&T. US West recognized the importance of contents and established TWE, 
a joint venture company with Time Warner. Through this JV company, US 
West built connection with content creation companies such as Warner 
Brothers and HBO, and at the same time made alliances with hardware and 
software companies such as Apple and Oracle to access the capabilities and 
resources required to develop and produce end-user terminals and 
applications for wide-band network services. AT&T has adopted a similar 
strategy. AT&T tries to secure influences on content creation business 
through the alliance of Interchange Imagination, an on- line service provider, 
and is concentrating in the development of Internet content business. AT&T is 
also participating in alliances for multimedia business to secure multimedia 
platform technologies. 
   To cope with the growth of demands on integrated services and grow into 
integrated telecom service providers, TOs should secure various capabilities 
and resources through the establishment of an integrated value chain which 
can control every processes from content creation to user 
platforms/applications, or from information generation to consumption. 
Considering the huge investment and expertise required for content creation, 
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it might be very risky and inefficient for a TO to directly participate in the 
content creation business. Outsourcing would be a more rational solution, 
though it would be necessary to secure its own contents to use it as a leverage 
in negotiations. It is also important for a TO to build a solid foundation on 
which it can create values for suppliers (contents, services, and equipment) 
and customers for the establishment of integrated value chain.  
 
[Figure 3-3] Strategic Alliances between U.S. West and AT&T for the 
          Provision of Integrated IT Services 
 
Source : Korea Telecom, Management and Technology, Vol. 102, 1998, 53. Chapter 4  
CASE STUDY OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN KOREA’S 
           TELECOM INDUSTRY 
 
 
4.1  Overview of Korea’s Telecom Industry 
 
4.1.1  Current Status of TOs 
 
   Article 4 of the Telecommunications Business Act divides the telecom 
industry into three categories: facilities-based service, special service, and 
value-added service. Service providers who are approved, registered or file 
applications to the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) to 
provide these servcies are called facilities-based service providers, special 
service providers, and value-added service providers, respectively. The 
facilities-based service providers would install telecom circuits and facilities 
and provide telephone and telegraph services for the public welfare. The 
special service providers are those who provide basic telecom services using 
the facilities of the facilities-based service providers or provide PBX services 
by installing appropriate facilities in the premises of customers. The value-
added service providers are those who provide telecom services other than 
basic telecom services by leasing telecom facilities from the facilities-based 
service providers. 
   [Table 4-1] shows the present status of facilities-based service providers in Korea 
by category. 
 
   1 
Content 
Creation 
Warner Brothers
U.S. West 
AirTouch 
TWE 
Time Warner
Cable 
Atlantic 
Wometcol/  
HBO Apple 
Oracle 
Interchange
AT & T 
General Magic 
Interchange
McCaw 
TCI  
Viacom 
    5 
End user 
equipment and 
application 
 
3 
Local service 
provision 
 
    2   
Service 
creation and 
provision 
 
     4 
 Switching & 
transmission 
Novell 
3DO 
GO 
SONY 
Lotus 
Lexis  
Source : Korea Telecom, “Management and Technology,”  January/February , 1998, 53. 
 34
 
   [Table 4-1] Present Status of Facilities-Based Service Providers 
Services  
Service 
Coverage  
No. of 
TOs  
Companies 
Local  Nation-wide  2  Korea Telecom, HANARO Telecom  
Long-distance Nation-wide  3  Korea Telecom, DACOM, ONSE Telecom  
International  Nation-wide  3  Korea Telecom, DACOM, ONSE Telecom  
Mobile cellular Nation-wide  2  SK Telecom , Shinsegi Telecom  
PCS Nation-wide  3  LG Telecom,  KT Freetel, Hansol PCS 
GMPCS Nation-wide  1  SK Telecom  
Nation-wide  2  Korea TRS, Anam Telecom  
TRS 
Regional 9  
Seoul TRS, Sebang Telecom,  Taegu TRS, Kwanju TRS,  
Chungnam TRS,  Saehan Telecom, Kangwon Telecom,   
Cheju TRS 
CT -2  Nation-wide  1  Korea Telecom  
Nation-wide  1  SK Telecom  
Paging 
 12  
Naray Telecom, Seoul Telecom, Happy Telecom ,  
Booil Tekecom, Sejung Telecom , Selim Telecom,  
Kwangju Telecom,  Shinwon Telecom, Chunbuk Telecom,  
Saehan Telecom, Kwangwon T elecom, Cheju Telecom  
Wireless Data Nation-wide  3  Airmedia, Intec Telecom, Hanse Telecom  
Facility lease  Nation-wide  6  
Korea Telecom, DACOM, Thrunet , G&G Telecom ,  
Dream Line,  ONSE Telecom 
Source : http://webdb.mic.go.kr, June 10, 1999. 
 
   As of April 1999, 154 companies are registered as special service 
providers with the MIC. Among those 30 companies are engaging in facility-
based resale, 136 companies in simple resale, and 16 companies in PBX 
business. Recent trend of integrating information, telecommunications and 
broadcasting has broadened the areas of value-added services, and many 
governments have developed the value-added services strategically to enhance 
competitiveness. Domestically, the rapid spread of personal computers and 
computerization of business processes and the advancement of telecom and 
networking technologies make the future of this buiness very bright, and the 
number of companies participating in the value-added telecom business have 
increased steadily. [Table 4-2] shows the number of service providers who 
filed applications with MIC by year. 
 
[Table 4-2] Number of Value-Added Service Providers Reported to MIC  
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998.6. 
Numbers of 
Companies  
156 253 342 610 946 1,234 
 
Source : MIC, “Annual Report on Telecommunications,” 1998, 54. 
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4.1.2 Status and Prospects of the IT Service Market 
 
1) Status of Domestic Telecom Market 
 
   As shown in [Figure 4-1], the Korean telecom market is fairly large 
compared with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Korea, and is growing 
fast. This growth has not been deterred by the recent financial crisis. It is 
expected that the proportion of the telecom industry in Korea’s GDP will be 
increasing continually.  
 
[Figure 4-1] Growth Rate of Domestic Telecom Market and Share of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Korea Telecom, “KT’s Business Strategy toward the 21st Century,” 1999, 16. 
 
   Pursuant to the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecom Services, Korea has opened its telecom market. The 
Korean government opened voice resale service market in 1998, and recently liberalized the foreign 
ownership limit to 49% in the wireless/wired sector from the existing 33% to induce foreign investments 
(from July 1999) and allowed foreigners to become major shareholders in Korean firms. The government 
also abolished the single person ownership limit for the facilities-based service providers to secure 
international competitiveness of domestic telecom companies. 
 
2) Prospect of Domestic IT Market 
 
   From the BA&H analysis in [Table 4-3], it is expected that the domestic 
wireless, data and Internet market will expand rapidly. The wireless market is 
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expected to maintain an annual average growth rate of 19% by 2002 thanks to 
continual growth of demands and rate reduction due to intensifying 
competition. The data and Internet markets will grow by more than 23% p.a., 
due to the explosive increase of contents, spread of E-commerce, and 
expansion of access capacities. Accordingly, the size of the domestic IT 
market will reach 25.7 trillion won by 2002, and by that time the appearance 
of an integrated telecom competitor is anticipated. 
 
[Table 4-3] Prospect of Domestic Telecom Market  
Domestic Telecom Market Size (unit : 100 million won) 
    CAGR  Difference  
 in size  
 1993 1997 2002E (‘97-’02) (‘97-’02) 
          
Wireless   2,150  41,070   97,610   19%   56,540  
Local telephony  22,510   30,820   52,520   11%  21,700  
Line to Mobile   -  -   30,730   19%   30,730  
Long-distance telephony   21,590   17,630   21,370   4%   3,740 
Data   4,290  9,160  30,450   27%   21,290  
International telephony  9,770  13,720   8,120  -10%   (5,600) 
ISP/OSP   270   2,840  7,900  23%   5,060 
Pay phone  5,610  5,800  5,650  -1%  (150) 
Cable T V  -     220   220   0%   - 
Directory assistance  500   1,200   2,040  11%  840  
Satellite communications  -  370   700   14%  330  
Total  66,690   122,830  257,310  16%  134,480 
 
Source : Korea Telecom, “KT’s Business Strategy toward the 21st Century,” 1999, 17. 
 
   The Korean IT market has been growing continuously in spite of the IMF bailout program. Following 
the refurbishing of the Korean regulatory system to cope with the market opening, it is expected that the 
participation of private firms and foreign TOs in the domestic telecom markets will increase. 
 
 
4.2 Case Analysis of Korea Telecom’s(KT) Strategic Alliances 
 
4.2.1 Present Status of Strategic Alliances 
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   Based on Yoshino’s classification mentioned in Chapter 2, KT’s alliance efforts 
can be divided into contractual alliances and equity alliances. 
   In this chapter, 82 cases of alliances made by KT during the past six years from 
1994 to May of 1999 were studied. Most of the necessary materials were collected 
from the KT departments concerned and some from other sources including 
newspapers. The detailed lists of the alliances can be seen in the Appendix. There was 
no alliance during the KT’s monopoly period until 1989, and the importance of 
strategic alliances was not recognized even after competition had been introduced in 
the fields of international telephony and va lue added services in 1990. With the 
second restructuring of the telecom industry in 1994, competition was introduced in 
the basic services including long distance, mobile, paging, etc., and since then 
strategic alliances have been considered as a means to meet the rapidly changing 
telecommunications environments. KT actively pursued strategic alliances in 1997, 
though such efforts withered of no avail following the 1998 financial crisis. 
 
[Table 4-4] Number of Strategic Alliances by Year 
Year  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  계  
Domestic   5  7  26  9  3  50(61%)  
Overseas  1  3  2  7  1   14(17%)  Contractual Alliances 
Sub-total  1  8  9  33  10  3  64(78%)  
Domestic   1   3  2   6(7%)  
Overseas  1  1  9   1   12(15%)  
Equity 
Alliances 
Sub-total  1  2  9  3  3   18(22%)  
Domestic   6  7  29  11  3  56(68%)  
Overseas  2  4  11  7  2   26(32%)  Total  
Sub-total  2(2%)  10(12%)  18(22%)  36(44%)  13(16%)  3(4%)  82(100%)  
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   68 percent of the alliances were with domestic firms, and contractual alliances 
took much larger proportion (78%) than equity alliances (22%). Such disproportion 
can be explained as KT tried to enhance its competitive strength to survive in the open 
market competition. Especially, concerning equity alliance, there was only one case of 
overseas investment since 1997. 
 
4.2.2 Analysis of Strategic Alliances 
 
1) Types of Strategic Alliances 
 
   [Table 4-5] shows that 78 percent of alliances were contractual ones which 
explains that short-term cooperative relations were more favored. This reflects that the 
flexibility of business complementing with each other was regarded as more 
important than the governance structure with long-term capital investment. 
   Most alliances in the marketing and technology were contractual alliances. The 
alliances in marketing were to increase the market share in the competitive long 
distance and international telephone markets, and the technological alliances were to 
acquire the advanced technologies through the technology transfer and joint 
developments such as fiber obtical cables, electronic commerce, next generation 
network planning, etc. 
 
[Table 4-5] Types of Strategic Alliances 
 
             Domestic  Overseas  Total 
Contractual Sales & Marketing  22 7 29(35%) 
Partners Alliance 
types 
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Technological 
alliances  
20 6 26(32%) 
Manufacturing 
alliances  
3  3(4%) 
Supply alliances  1  1(1%) 
Composite 
alliances  
4 1 5(6%) 
Alliances  
Subtotal 50(78%) 14(22%) 64(78%) 
Equity participation 4 9 13(16%) 
Joint venture   3 3(4%) 
Consortium 2  2(2%) 
Equity 
Alliances  
Subtotal 6(33%) 12(67%) 18(22%) 
Total 56(68%) 26(32%) 82(100%) 
 
   Equity alliances were more active with foreign companies than with domestic 
ones as you can find six domestic and twelve overseas alliances in the above table. 
The domestic equity alliances were made in limited areas such as KT Freetel, GMPCS, 
and so on, due to regulatory restriction on Korea Telecom. 
 
   The overseas equity alliances were made in an effort to overcome diverse barriers 
imposed on KT in the domestic market. Such alliances were concentrated mostly in 
developing countries, especially in the fields of telecom network expansion, wireless 
mobile services, and paging services in which KT has accumulated considerable 
experiences and know-how. But the lack of alliances with TOs in advanced countries,  
clearly shows insufficient diversity in the strategic alliances made by KT. Recent 
stalemate in the overseas business activities since the 1997 financial crisis implies that 
KT has not been adequately responding to the globalization of the economy. To meet 
the global telecom demands and secure international competitiveness, KT should 
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make every endeavor to forge global equity alliances. 
 
2) Motives of Strategic Alliances 
 
   [Table 4-6] shows the motives of strategic alliances.8) 
   As shown in [Table 4-6], strategic alliances were formed to meet the competitive 
challenge more effectively(32%), and to expand market share(28%). This implies that  
strategic alliances were introduced to increase market share and to be more 
competitive in the telecommunications market. 
 
[Table 4-6]  Motives of Strategic Alliances 
 
 Domestic  Overseas  Total 
Risk dispersion (Cost - sharing)  10  2  12(8%)  
Countermeasure to competitors 
(increase market share)  
32  14  46(29%)  
Pursuit of economic efficiency (complementary  
characteristics of technologies)  
13  5  18(11%)  
Opportunity to enter into new market  5  14  29(18%)  
Early introduction of new products and 
Preoccupation of markets 
28  9  37(24%)  
Acquisition of business licenses 4  11  15(10%)  
 
Note) Since two or more motive are allocated to each case, the number of alliances on the  
     above table exceeds the total.  
                                                 
8) Jung-Ho Pyo, “A Study on Strategic Alliances among IT Operators,” 1996, 61. 
Partners 
Motives 
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   Alliances as a means to acquire business licenses and to reduce risks is rarely 
found in the table. In domestic alliances only four government-approved project 
including PCS can be regarded to be made for the acquisition of the licenses. All the 
foreign alliances were made to secure bridgeheads in overseas markets such as Latin 
America, Southeast Asia, India, and Russia.  
   The percentage of risk dispersion motive (cost sharing) is relatively low, because 
there were not many large projects, which require huge investments and R&D 
expenditure. Most of such alliance were with doemstic firms.  
   The proportion of economic efficiency motives is also low (11%), and a few 
alliances were made in the sectors of ISDN, ATM, fiber optics, wireless radio and 
cable TVs. However, the number of this type of alliances is expected to increase 
sharply.  
 
3) Relationship Structure of Alliances 
 
   To understand the relationship among partner firms in the alliances, I categorized 
the alliances into three groups: horizontal alliances in an industry, vertical alliances 
among industries, and multilateral alliances9). 
   As shown in [Table 4-7], 44 percent of strategic alliances were made vertically 
among industries, and 39 percent were made horizontally within an industry, and the 
remaining 17 percent were made in the multilateral relations. Considering that most 
traditional interfirm alliances have vertical relationships, Korea Telecom’s alliances 
were mostly made with firms in the same industry.  
                                                 
9) Jung-Ho Pyo, “A Study on Strategic Alliances among IT Operators,” 1996, 60. 
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[Table 4-7] Relationship Structure of Alliances 
 
 Domestic  Foreign Total  
Horizontal alliances in an industry  13 19 32(39%) 
Vertical alliances among industries  30 6 36(44%) 
Multilateral alliances  12 2 14(17%) 
Total 55(67%) 27(33%) 82(100%) 
 
   The relational structure of the domestic and overseas strategic alliances is quite 
different with each other. Vertical alliances are more popular among domestic firms, 
and horizontal alliances are more common with foreign firms. This explains that 
Korea Telecom favors companies which it can maintain its control in the structure of 
the value chain, and that it is not ready for horizontal alliances with competing 
companies.  
   This implies that Korea Telecom needs to implement strategic alliances with 
domestic companies more actively to cope with foreign companies making inroads 
into the domestic market in the near future. Strategic alliances in the same industry is 
more common in the international alliances, which implies that Korea Telecom is 
getting the technology in need from the advanced foreign companies.  
   Multilateral alliances are utilized widely in marketing such as telephone card sales 
or distribution networks. 
 
 
4.2.3 Evaluation of Strategic Alliances 
 
   Based on the above analysis, strategic alliances of Korea Telecom show the 
Motives Partners 
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following characteristics: 
 
   1) Korea Telecom did not place much importance to strategic alliances because of 
its monopolistic/oligopolistic position in the telecom market. With the second 
reorganization of the telecom industry in 1994, it began to pursue alliances and its 
activities were most active in 1997, but they soon receded with the financial crisis 
after 1998. 
 
   2) Contractual alliances in marketing and technology were more favored than 
equity alliances. 
 
   3) Motives such as expansion of market share and market preoccupation to secure 
competitiveness show relatively high proportions. 
 
   4) Vertical alliances are more common with domestic companies, but horizontal 
alliances are more common with foreign firms. 
 
   [Table 4-8] shows that strategic alliances of Korea Telecom have little connection 
with the long term business goals to become a global integrated telecom group. Also,  
strategic alliances were taken as complementary measures, but in the future the 
company need to reconsider the importance of strategic alliance as a way to enhance 
its competitiveness in core business to meet the rapidly changing environment. 
   Alliances were made mostly in wired telecommunications areas, with forty six 
percent of the total. Most of the alliance partners were domestic companies rather than 
foreign ones. Domestic alliances occurred in most strategic business areas but 
overseas alliances are concentrated mainly on projects in developing countries. There 
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was no alliance with companies in advanced countries in strategic business areas like 
wireless communications, multimedia, and broadcasting. 
 
[Table 4-8] Number of KT’s Alliances by Strategic Business 
 
Domestic  Foreign Total 
  
Business 
alliance 
Capital 
alliance 
Business 
alliance 
Capital 
alliance 
Business 
alliance 
Capital 
alliance Total  
Wired  29   10   39   39(46%)  
Wireless radio  7  3  4   11  3  14(16%)  
Multimedia  10   2  1  12  1  13(15%)  
Overseas business    12   12  12(14%)  
Broadcasting  2  1   1  2  3(4%)  
Business diversification  4     4   4(5%)  
Total  50  5  17  13  67  18  85(100%)  
 
Note) The number of business alliances with foreign partners exceeds the total by three, 
     since two cases of next -generation network design and joint R&D on ATM network 
     are classified as wired/wireless alliance.  
Source : Korea Telecom,  “KTVision 2005,”  1996. 
Partner 
Strategic 
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4.3.  Recommendations for Korea Telecom 
 
   For the success of strategic alliance, the first factor to consider is the connection 
of alliances with the company’s strategic objectives. Strategic alliance should be 
regarded as an alternative strategy and implemented accordingly. Next, it is necessary 
to review the competence and competitive advantage of the company to find out its 
strengths and weaknesses. Any weakness can be rectified through strategic alliances. 
On the basis of such analysis, companies can find good partner(s) for the alliance. 
   In this chapter we will examine KT’s business goals and its competitive advantage 
and suggest direction for KT’s strategic alliance in the future.  
 
 
4.3.1  Strategic Objectives of Korea Telecom 
 
1) Future Telecom Market Analysis 
 
   The Korean telecommunications market is forecast to be 25.7 billion wons and a 
few more national competitors will appear in the year 2002.  Wire telephone traffic 
will transfer to the wireless telephony and wireless market will keep on increasing 
with additional 5-6 million subscribers until 2002.  
   The exploding expansion of internet will lead the change of social life and the 
number of internet users will reach 10 million in the year 2002. Many business 
opportunities will be expected in the network interconnection rather than in the 
internet itself. The expansion will depend on the users, and Korea Telecom will have 
to overcome the limits with the successful entry into the wireless market. 
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   Network construction focused on the internet will be a prerequisite for future 
business. Future success will also depend on marketing and network operations. 
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[Table 4-9] Strategy of Foreign TOs 
 Status Actions 
AT&T  
 · No customer base 
 · Provide diverse services through various 
   networks 
 · Move of RBOCs to long-distance markets 
 · Possible access to local service market  
 · Necessity of diversification 
 · Disposal/disinvestment of non-telecom sectors 
 · Acquisition of TCG, TCI to secure customer bases  
 · Active integration of services 
 · Transition of service network to Internet-based network 
 · Pursue network + service provider 
 · Utilize cable TV network 
SBC 
 · Local service provider 
 · Growth of local service market, decrease 
of 
   revenue 
 · Rapid growth of wireless services, Internet  
   access services 
 · Participate in growing markets such as wireless,  
   Internet access, etc. 
 · Expansion of subscriber networks through M&A and 
   network based Internet service strategy  
 · Enhancement of subscriber network to accommodate  
   Internet services 
BT  
 · 27 million subscribers 
 · Major shareholder of Cellnet  
 · Concentrate in international telecom 
   business 
 · Weakening of dominant carrier position 
 in the UK market is expected 
 · Enhance netwo rk + service business through  
   participation in multimedia business 
 ·.Enhance competitive edges on multimedia-base 
   network service 
 ·.Expand business areas to contents creation,  
   e-commerce 
 ·.International alliances, technological development,  
   investment in networks 
Bell  
South  
 · RBOC (24 million subscribers, 4 million 
   wireless customers)  
 · Impending competition in local services 
 · Enhance its position in wired/wireless market with 
   competitive edges in marketing 
   (brand, service integration, costs)  
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 · Preoccupy Internet service market  
 · Enter into international service market 
 
Source : Korea Telecom, “KT’s Business Strategy toward the 21st Century,” 1999, 50. 
 
 
2) Emergence as a Global Carrier 
 
   The strategic goal of Korea Telecom is to become one of the leading global 
carriers with strategic alliances and future core competence10). For this purpose, the 
first thing will be to acquire the IMT-2000 license, which is expected to bring a great 
change in the mobile market. The second will be to invest in data business 
progressively. Korea Telecom plans to increase investment in the super highway 
network infrastructure and PC on- line communications. 
                                                 
10) Korea Telecom, “KT’s Business Strategy toward the 21st Century,”  1999, 53. 
 49
 
   Korea Telecom endeavours to become the first leading internet company until the 
year 2002 through the renovation of business processes, organization, personnel 
administration, etc. 
   Third, is the turnaround of unprofitable businesses. Directory assistance services, 
public telephone services and satellite services will turn to profitable businesses, and 
marginal businesses such as CT-2 and administration communications services will be 
withdrawn by 2001. 
   Fourth, is to expand the present core business.  Korea Telecom will effectively  
defend the present international and long distance call markets, and enhance the 
profitability of the local call services by raising the rates. 
 
[Table 4-10] Performance Targets of Korea Telecom 
 
Year  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  
Revenue (100 million won) 87,739  102,310  115,280  125,540  138,780  
Current net profit (100 million won) 2,583  3,180  5,160  6,730  9,170  
No. of employees 58,202  49,191  44,491  44,491  44,491  
Sales per employee (100 million won) 1.5  2.1  2.6  2.8  3.1  
Return on equity (%) 4.8  5.8  7.3  9.1  11.7  
Debt ratio (%) 190.2  141  138  128  116  
 
Source : Korea Telecom, “KT’s Business Strategy toward the 21st Century,” 1999, 55. 
 
 
4.3.2  Analysis of KT’s Core Competence 
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   In this section, I analyzed KT’s core competence by using the value chain model 
of Michael E. Porter. The result is summarized in [Table 4-11]. 
 
1) Management Competence 
 
   Due to strict regulation and direct/indirect control of the Korean government,. KT 
could not take proper measures to meet the rapidly changing environment. The first 
thing to do for KT is to secure complete autonomy in the management to cope with 
market opening and deregulation. Recent revisions of the Telecom Business Act allow 
KT to participate in new business areas, but now it suffers from improper 
organizational structure and shortage of qualified personnel. KT has enjoyed economy 
of scope in the basic telecom sector thanks to its dominant position as a public 
telecom service provider in Korea. However, such advantage acts instead as an 
obstacle in participating in new business areas because of organizational inertia in 
management. 
 
2) Technological Capabilities in Network Management and Operations 
 
   As the dominant network service provider in Korea, KT’s nationwide network 
management capabilities has largely been satisfactory. Such networking capacities 
connecting every customer premise equipment in the nation (local access function of a 
global network) could act as an edge in negotiating strategic alliances with other 
foreign TOs. 
   Viewed objectively, there is a large gap between KT’s network 
managing/operating capabilities and the global standard in spite of KT’s continuing 
investment in R&D activities. The more serious problem is that the gap is widening 
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rapidly in the fields of cutting-edge core telecom technologies, although KT has some 
advantage in terms of construction and O&M of basic telecom networks. Thus, the 
acquisition or outsourcing of such advanced technologies is one of the most urgent 
tasks for KT. 
 
3) Financing Capabilities 
 
   KT had enjoyed good financial health until the 1997 financial crisis which has 
deteriorated revenue base and profitability of telecom business in general. It is 
expected that demands on financial resources will increase continuously due to 
redemption of telephone installation deposits, accumulated deficits in public services 
including directory assistance, support to national IT projects, contributions to various 
R&D projects, and investment in new businesses such as PCS and IMT-2000.  
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4) Marketing Capabilities 
 
   Leading TOs in advanced countries use a variety of marketing strategies to cope 
with cutthroat competition. Compared with such TOs, KT lacks experience and know-
how in marketing. 
   Investment in marketing activities falls behind that of other TOs in advanced 
countries. Strategic approaches to pricing such as cost-based tariff system and 
selective price packages are rather limited due to governmental regulation. 
 
   In summary, the list of KT’s strengths is as follows: nationwide telecom network, 
skilled manpower, diverse telecom services, and robust financial structure. On the 
other hands, the list of weaknesses includes: government’s interference on 
management, insufficient experience and capabilities in marketing, lack of authorities 
to setting service rates, lack of advanced technologies, and business structure heavily 
biased to basic services. 
   The analysis indicates that, compared with major TOs in the global market, KT 
makes good scores in terms of quantitative appearance, though it shows weaknesses 
in terms of productivity and technology base.  
   To secure competitive advantage over other TOs, KT has to renovate its internal 
business processes such as provision of new services, integrated marketing activities, 
enhancement and upgrading of network facilities, rationalization of human resource 
management, improvement of R&D productivity, and so forth. Also, it needs to 
readjust the value-creation activities within the organization and tries to connect its 
internal activities with external value chains in an appropriate way.  
   To do this, KT has to more actively engage in strategic alliances with other 
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companies and encourage merger and acquisition of other businesses which can be of 
help in enhancing KT’s competitiveness. 
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[Table 4-11] Comparative Analysis of KT’s International Competitiveness 
Scale 
Indicators Detailed indicators 
Very 
high High Middle Low 
Very 
low 
Support activities 
Human resource management 
% employee decrement as of 1995 compared with 
1984  (Rationalization) 
    ◎◆ 
Input of human resources 
Employees as of 1995 compared with 1991  
(Rationalization) 
   ◆ ◎ 
R&D 
R&D Investment in 1995 ($ million)    ◆ ◎ 
R&D Investment 
R&D Investment compared with revenue in 1995 (%) ◎◆     
R&D manpower in 1992     ◎◆ 
R&D Manpower 
R&D manpower compared with total employees in 
1992 (%) 
   ◆ ◎ 
No. of researchers engaged in IT industry in 1995   ◎ ◆  
Infrastructure of R&D 
% of IT researchers compared with total no. of researcher in 
scientific/technological fields  
◎◆    
Procurement 
Investment in telecom industry in 1994 ($ million))   ◎ ◆  
Investment size 
Investment prospects in telecom industry between 
1995-2000 ($ million)  
◎◆    
Negotiation power Use of negotiation power in private contracts (qualitative evaluation)    
■  
 
Scale 
Indicators Detailed indicators 
Very 
high High Middle Low 
Very 
low 
Generic activities 
Construction of telecom networks 
Per-line investment in 1994 ($)    ◆ ◎ Investment in telecom 
networks Investment mcompared with revenue in 1994 (%) ◎◆     
Telephone penetration per 100 population in 1994     ◎◆ 
Expected penetration per 100 population in 2000   ◎◆   
Basic telecom network 
facilities 
Penetration of pay phone per 1000 population in 1994  ◎◆    
Advanced telecom No. of packet service subscribers in 1994    ◎◆  
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network facilities No. of ISDN subscribers in 1994    ◎◆  
Capacities of networ  
construction 
Capacities of network construction in 1995 (qualitative 
evaluation)   ■   
O&M of telecom networks 
Per-employee lines in 1995 ◎◆     
Annual average growth rate of per-employee lines between 
1991-95 
    ◎◆ 
Telecom network  
management  
Annual average growth rate of per-employee lines between 
1984-95 
◎◆     
% repairs within standard time frame in 1994 
(qualitative evaluation)  
■    O&M of telecom  
networks 
No. of faults per 100 lines in 1994  ◆ ◎   
% of Automation systems in 1995 ■     O&M of existing 
facilities % of electronic systems in 1995 ■     
% of digital systems in 1994 (%)    ◎◆  O&M of advanced  
systems % of deployment of F/O systems in 1995 (qualitative 
evaluation)    
■  
Marketing and service activities 
Integrated marketing Adoption of integrated marketing techniques 
(qualitative evaluation) 
    ■ 
Advertising costs in 1993 ($million)     ■ 
Advertising costs 
% of operating costs compared with revenue in 1993     ■ 
Value-added services Value-added services (qualitative evaluation)     ■ 
Readjustment of tariff schedule 
(qualitative evaluation) 
    ■ 
Strategic tariff plan     ■ 
Tariff policies 
Local call rate in 1994($)    ◎ ◆ 
주 ) ◎ : competitiveness evaluated in terms of ranking,  ◆ : Competitiveness evaluated in terms  
       of average and dispersion  ■ : Competitiveness evaluated qualitatively  
Source : Jae -ho Lee, “A Study on Information and Telecommunications Regulation Policy and  
       Operator’s Strategies in Major Countries,” ETRI, 1997, 33-34. 
 
4.3.3 Recommendations for Korea Telecom 
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   Based on the review of the changing global telecom market environment, and the  
results of KT’s strategic alliances described in the above sections, the following 
recommendations are made for KT to become a leading TO providing integrated IT 
services in the future global markets. 
   First, KT needs to make a systematic approach to strategic alliance. Most of the 
alliances made by KT up to now have been on basic telecom services, and only a few 
cases were concerned with multimedia, broadcasting, and so forth. This means that 
KT has not yet developed strategic alliance as a tool in achieving its strategic 
objectives. Most of the alliances made by KT have been concentrated in simple and 
supplementary businesses, and it seems that the governmental intervention has 
restricted KT’s capabilities in forging alliances with partners. To overcome such 
restriction, KT has to secure managerial independence from the government. 
   Second, to provide advanced integrated services, KT has to actively pursue 
alliances with firms which have cutting-edge technologies. In the future, the telecom 
market will be developed around the Internet and multimedia technologies based on 
the concept of “Time-to-Market.” 
   Therefore, the survival of a corporation will depend on the securing of core 
technologies and the creation of value-added through strategic alliances with market-
leaders with specialized technologies such as contents creation or application/end-user 
equipment development, as shown in the case of Cisco System’s New World 
strategy.11) Along with this, KT has to seek diversification of alliances including joint 
R&D efforts. 
   Third, KT has to find a way to disperse the risks and huge investments associated 
with the modernization and enhancement of its telecom networks through alliances. 
                                                 
11) ETRI, “Weekly Technological Trend,” Vol. 893, 1999, 36-45. 
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   To provide integrated IT services such as e-commerce, wireless/broadband data 
services and digital broadcasting services, the enhancement of existing telecom 
networks is inevitable. Network is not just an entry to the market any more. It has 
become a market itself and network administrators have to add values to the 
information flowing through the networks12). Huge capital investments will be 
required to build such network infrastruc ture, which will make the network 
construction projects inherently risky. In this regard, KT has to forge alliances to 
avoid risks inherent in building such networks. 
   Fourth, KT has to actively pursue participation in global alliances made in the 
rapidly-changing global telecom market. As mentioned by Professor J. Dunning of 
Redding University in the UK, super carriers are using strategic alliances and M&A 
as a tool for reducing costs and maximizing operational efficiencies through economy 
of scale. It is expected that the global telecom market will be reorganized by a few 
alliance groups as can be seen in the capital alliance of AT&T, BT and Japan Telecom 
and the struggle for IDC by C&W and NTT. As it is certain that WorldPartner joined 
by KT will be dis integrated sooner or later, KT has to prepare to act as a telecom hub 
in this region. In addition, KT has to diversify its geographic markets by promoting 
overseas projects especially in developing countries. In this way, KT can overcome 
the instabilities and risks in the business environment and secure another revenue 
generation base. 
   Lastly, KT has to actively utilize strategic alliances for entering into new markets 
or business diversification. For core profit-generation businesses such as wireless 
mobile services or the growth businesses such as broadcasting services, KT has to 
make alliances with domestic companies to secure diverse revenue-generation base 
                                                 
12) William T. Esrey, CEO of Sprint, “Information Week,” May 12, 1999. 
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and cope with the entry of foreign TOs into the domestic market. Strategic alliances 
can also be used in business diversification through strengthening of marketing 
capabilities, establishment of cutting-edge IT systems, and transfer to advanced cost 
structure. 
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Chapter 5  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
   With the rapid changes in the IT industry, market- leading TOs with superior 
technological competence, financial capabilities and service development capabilities 
such as AT&T, BT, DT, TI and NTT are accelerating their moves for capital alliances 
and M&A to take advantageous position in the global telecom market.  
   The domestic telecom industry has endeavored to establish full-scale competition 
structure in a short time span under the principle of ‘domestic competition first, 
international competition second’. But now with the complete opening of the 
domestic market, domestic TOs have to pursue strategic alliances with domestic firms 
to defend domestic IT market, as well as foreign TOs to secure competitive edges and 
create revenue-generation base in overseas markets. 
   In this study, I reviewed the cases of KT’s strategic alliances and categorized them 
by configuration, motive, and relational structure to find out the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the alliances. 
 
   Based on the analysis of the global IT markets, the transformation of the 
regulatory environment, cases of KT’s strategic alliances, and KT’s strategic 
objectives and competence, I summarize the desirable way of strategic alliances for  
KT as follows: 
 
   First, KT has to establish a management system to approach strategic 
alliances in a systematic way. 
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 ㅇ Lack of connection between alliances and KT’s strategic objectives 
 ㅇ Removal of legal and regulatory limitation →Secure managerial 
  independence from the government 
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   Second, KT has to more actively push forward with strategic alliances to secure 
up-to-date technological capabilities to develop integrated services. 
 ㅇ Future IT demand will be emerging around the Internet and multimedia 
   technologies 
 ㅇ The survival of an IT company will depend on technological competence 
   in specialized fields such as content creation, service provision,  
   development of application and end-user equipment, etc. 
 
   Third, KT has to disperse the risks and huge investments associated with network 
modernization/enhancement through strategic alliances. 
 ㅇ Network modernization/enhancement is inevitable for the provision of 
   integrated services →high risks and heavy investments  
 ㅇ Dispersion of risks and reduction of the heavy investment burden →  
   adopt network alliances  
 
   Fourth, KT has to aggressively engage in capital alliances to cope with 
global hegemonism and secure competitive advantages in the long- term. 
 ㅇ Capital alliances →Super TO: reduction of costs and expenses, 
   maximization of service efficiencies 
 ㅇ Emerging as a regional telecom carrier in Asia →Regional telecom hub 
 ㅇ Advancing in overseas markets focused in developing countries : 
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   geographic diversification, enhancement of negotiation powers 
 
   Fifth, KT has to actively utilize strategic alliances in entering new 
markets and for business diversification.  
 ㅇ Core revenue-generation business, growth business → forge alliances 
   with domestic firms to secure diverse revenue-generation base and to 
   cope with the advancement of foreign TOs in the domestic market 
 ㅇ Establishment of advanced IT systems, promotion of marketing 
   capabilities, transformation to advanced cost-based system 
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   [Figure 5-1] shows the summary of the above recommendation. 
 
[Figure 5-1] Desirable Direction of Strategic Alliances for KT 
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APPENDIX 
 
Strategic Alliances of Korea Telecom 
 
1. Contractual Alliances 
ㅇ Domestic : 50 Cases(’95 ~ ’99) 
Contents  Partners Types Relation
Card alliance for the provision of masterphone 
(95.7) 
5 companies 
(Samsung, BC,) 
Sales & Marketing Diversification
Alliance for KTCard business(joint marketing with 
tour and financial co.)(95.7~98.6) 
12Companies 
(Korean Airline.) 
“ “
Public telephone service with credit cards (95.12) 
5 Companies 
(Samsung,Kookmin, … ) 
“ “
Manufacturing & marketing of co-brand cards with 
allied companies using the distribution channel of 
Jinro(96.12) 
Jinro High Living “ “
KT cards marketing with domestic agents (96~97) 4 companies including 
Namu travel 
“ “
Complex and multifunction multicom cards 
alliance (97.11) 
4 companies including 
Kukmin cards 
“ “
Domestic sales of world phone cards on 
consignment (97) 
13 companies including 
Korea National Tourism 
Organization 
“ “
Cooperation on the purchase and installation of KT 
ISDN termination equipment (98.6) 
8 companies Parts supply 
Vertical industry 
alliance
Exhibition & sales of KT products on consignment 
(97) 
Consigned agents  Sales & marketing “
Joint business on integrated logistics information 
system (97.6) 
KL-NET Complex alliance Horizontal industry 
alliances
Business cooperation on integrated logistics 
information system (97.6) 
2 transportaion 
companies 
Sales & marketing 
Diversified industry 
alliance
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Contents  Partners Types 
Cooperation to develop EDI S/W and secure service 
users (95) 
11 S/W companies Complex alliance Vertical industry alliance
Cooperation to enhance the efficiency of SI business 
(97) 
34 companies Sales & Marketing 
Collecting agency of the telephone bill (97.11) 2 distribution co.s “ Diversified alliance
Cooperation on the telephone information service 
(97.10) 
5 mobile telephone 
companies 
“ Vertical industry alliance
Joint construction of the telecommunication ducts 
(97.5) 
G&G Telecom Product alliance Horizontal alliance
Joint installation and use of CT -2 station (96.11) 10 CT-2 companies “ 
Joint provision of CT-2+ & cooperation (97.5) SKT Happy telecom Sales & Marketing 
Cooperation to develop Kornet-Nawoonuri package 
service (98.5) 
NawooCom “ 
Agreement on the joint use of Kornet network (98.5) Hansol teleocm “ Vertical industry alliance
Joint advertisements of CT -2 (96.11) 
015 service co.s’ 
association 
“ 
Horizontal industry 
Joint use of the partner’s advertisement medium 
(97.7) 
SBS,SDS " Diversified alliance
Joint contribution on CT-2 development 97.11) CT-2 companies Technological alliance H
Joint development of IMT-2000 technology (97.1) ETRI  “ Vertical industry alliance
Joint development of vertual banking system  (96.8) 25 banks “ Diversified alliance
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Contents  Partners TYpes Relation
Joint development of optical distribution 
equipment  (97) 
4 companies Technological 
alliance 
Vertical industry alliance
Cooperation on the development of I-vision 
VOD applied services (95.4) 
20 companies “ “ 
Transfer of TIMS technology (97.7) 2 companies “ “ 
Transfer of the voice recognition software 
(96.12) 
5 companies “ “ 
Transfer of TOMS technology (97.7) 6 companies “ “ 
Joint development of voice dialing technology  
(97.10) 
Related compnies “ “ 
Joint development of optical connector related 
products  (97.1) 
3 companies “ “ 
Joint development of the GIS emulator  (97.1) Related companies “ “ 
Joint development of AVL technology for GIS 
(97.5) 
“ “ “ 
Joint development of internet telephony 
technology (97.5) 
“ “ “ 
Development of communication technology for 
optical fiber subscriber network (96.11) 
5 companies “ “ 
Development of vertual stock market system 
(97.11) 
11 security co.’s “ Diversified alliance
Transfer of ribbon optical fiber cable technology 
(97.6) 
2 companies “ Vertical industry alliance
Technology transfer of the optical fiber 
distribution box and termination box (97.9) 
Related companies “ “ 
Technology transfer on central management 
system of public telephones (97.10) 
3 companies “ “ 
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Contents  Partners Types Relation
FLOMS technology transfer 
(97.6) 
4 companies Technology transfer Vertical industry alliance
Joint cooperation agreement 
(98.10) 
Hanjin Complex alliance Vertical
Business cooperation 
agreement (98.11) 
Korea logistics information 
communication Co. Technology alliance “ 
Cooperation on the integrated 
logistics information system 
(98.11) 
12 companies including  
3I Co. 
Complex alliance “ 
Joint cooperation agreement 
(98.11) 
LG Mart Marketing Horizontal
Joint cooperation agreement 
(98.11) 
Hyundae contruction co. Marketing “ 
Consignment contract on 
marketing (98.11) Lotte Data Communication “ Vertical
Consignment Contract on 
Supply management of line 
Terminal(99.3) 
2 Companies “ “ 
Consignment contract on 
marketing (99.2) 
SDS “ “ 
Contract on the use of Value 
Added services (99.5) 
Hanaro   Horizontal
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ㅇ Overseas : 14 Cases(’94 ~ ’97) 
Contents  Partners Types Relation
Overseas sales on consignment of world phone 
cards (97)(Hongkong, UK, France, Guam, Saipan, 
Poland, Indonesia) 
6 foreign companies Sales & Marketing Diversiffied alliance
Overseas sales of Ktcards on consignments 
(97)(Australia, Poland) 2 foreign companies  “ 
Cooperation on new internet business such as 
electronic commerce 
3 foreign co.’s 
including Lucent 
Technology  
Technology alliance 
Vertical industry 
alliance
Bellcore Horizons Program(97.5) Bellcore “ 
Horizontal industry 
alliance
NCS Technology Transfer (97.11) Novel/Lotus  “ 
Vertical industry 
alliance
Joint development & experiment of ATM (96.6) BT,NTT “ 
Horizontal industry 
alliance
Agreement on ATM interface experiment (95.8) KDD “ 
Development of special fiber optical technology 
(97.9) AP-CRC (Australia) “ 
Vertical industry 
alliance
Agreement on business (98.11)  JAST(Japan) Complex alliance 
Horizontal industry 
alliance
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Name of Alliances Contents  Partners 
World Partners 
Provision of worldsource global services 
to the multinational companies. (95.11) 
Investors :  AT&T(40%), KDD(24%),  
Unisource(20%), ST(16%) 
Non-investment members : 8 Asian co.’s, 2 
European Co.’s, 1 North American Co. 
FNA(Financial 
Network 
Association) 
Provision of the global telecommunication 
services to the major financial companies 
(94.7) 
Asia-Pacific : 6 including KT 
North America : 2 including MCI 
Europe : 8 including FT 
Pacific Skylink 
Service 
Construction of the int’l TV transmission 
network in Asia-Pacific region leasing 
transponders of Intelsat (95,1) 
3 TV broadcasting program transmission 
companies of US, Japan, Hongkong 
Skyways Alliance 
Construction of the worldwide aviation 
network using Inmarsat communication 
satellites (96.3) 
4 earth station operating companies and 4 other 
companies 
Infonet Service 
Corp. 
Domestic marketing of Infonet services 
using co-brand (97.10) 
Investors : 6 companies including 
Telefonica ,KDD, Telia, Telstra, KPN, Swiss 
PTT 
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2. Equity Alliances 
   
  ㅇ Domestic : 6 Cases(’97 ~ ’98) 
Contents  Partners Types 
Enter the wireless data business 
(97) Intech Telecom 
Participate in the capital 
investment Horizontal industry alliance
Secure the technology and 
experience on CATV (97) CATV companies “ 
Provision of the multi-video 
new services (98) Subsidiary of Intelsat “ Vertical industry alliance
K-TV satellite business 
(98) 
Domestic and foreign  
broadcasting companies 
Consortium 
Establishment of KT Freetel 
(97) 
 “ 
Provision of GMPCS (95) ICO Korea 
Participate in the capital 
investment (60%) Joint Venture
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    ㅇ Overseas : 12 Cases(’94 ~ ’98) 
Countries Details  Partners Types 
Mexico Local/ long distance and int’l call, wireless 
communication services  (96.12) 
Miditel JVC 
Vietnam Telephone network expansion (96.4) VNPT BOT  
Philippines Basic telecommunication business (94) Retelcom JVC 
Mogolia Participate in the privatization of MT (96.2) Mongolia Telecom Capital Investment
Japan Satellite broadcasting business (96.9) KSB “ 
Cambodia TRS service (96.7) MTM  “ 
Poland Paging Services (96.4) Telepage “ 
China GSM cellular service (96.4) Ahhui Shenhan “ 
Taiwan City phone service (96.3) PTT “ 
Japan One number service (96.1) ONS  “ 
India Paging services(95.9) MKTLr JVC 
Russia Local telephone service in Vladivostok and GSM 
service in the area  (98.12) 
NTC Capital Investment
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